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Crime, morality, and 
republicanism 
Richard Dagger 
One of the abiding concerns of the philosophy of law has been to establish the relationship 
between law and morality. 1 Within the criminal law, this concern often takes the form of 
debates over legal moralism-that is, "the position that immorality is sufficient for criminali-
zation" (Alexander 2003: 131). This paper approaches these debates from the perspective of 
the recently revived republican tradition in politics and law. Contrary to what is usually taken 
to be liberalism's hostility to legal moralism, and especially to attempts to promote virtue 
through the criminal law, the republican approach takes the promotion of virtue to be one 
of the necessary aims of a polity. The virtue in question, however, is a specifically civic virtue, 
and calling for its promotion does not entail that the criminal law should be a straightforward 
reflection of the conventional morality of a society. What republicanism offers, instead, is a 
form of legal moralism resting on a distinttively civic morality that lays particular stress on 
such virtues as fair play and tolerance. 
According to the republican conception of the criminal law, the questions of what should 
count as a crime and how a polity should respond to criminal offenses are to be answered by 
the members of a polity. In answering, though, they should not think themselves free to respond 
to these questions however they please, or however the majority at the time pleases. Moral and 
other practical considerations must play a part in determining what counts as a crime and how 
to respond to those who commit crimes. Such considerations, however, are not resolved by 
straightforward appeal to what is morally right and wrong, or to what criminals do and do not 
deserve. Some conception of the polity, and of how its members stand in relation to one another, 
is also necessary. 
In this way the republican version of legal moralism occupies the ground between "pure" 
legal moralism, which holds that "acts that are immoral and degrading may be criminally pun-
ished, even if they are harmful in no other way" (Alexander 2003: 132), and the "liberal" posi-
tion, according to which harmfulness rather than moral wrongness should determine whether 
an action or activity is criminal. To establish the soundness of this position, however, I shall need 
to say something about the varieties of both legal moralism and republicanism. These are the 
tasks I take up in the first two parts of this essay, respectively. In Part Three, I elaborate the repub-
lican conception oflegal moralism-a conception resting on the civic morality of fair play-and 
conclude by demonstrating how it underpins the criminal law. 
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Part one: Legal moralism and its varieties 
Legal moralism emerged in the course of two controversies over the proper extent of the 
criminal law. The earlier of these involved John Stuart Mill and his British compatriot, the jurist 
James Fitzjames Stephen. In 1873, the year of Mill's death, Stephen published a rebuttal to the 
"one very simple principle" that Mill had advanced 14 years earlier in On Liberty.According to 
Mill's principle, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" (Mill 1991: 14). In response, Stephen maintained 
that the criminal law quite properly affirms "a principle which is absolutely inconsistent with 
and contradictory to Mr. Mill's-the principle, namely, that there are acts of wickedness so gross 
and outrageous that, self-protection apart, they must be prevented as far as possible at any cost 
to the offender, and punished, if they occur, with exemplary severity .... "2 
Although this nineteenth-century controversy looms in the background, the term "legal 
moralism" itself seems to be a product of the second controversy, which has come to be known 
as "the Hart-Devlin debate." What sparked this debate was the official Wolfenden Committee 
Report of 1957, which recommended that neither homosexual activity nor prostitution should 
be outlawed in Britain when conducted in private between consenting adults. This report pro-
voked a British judge, Lord Patrick Devlin, to argue that "society is justified in taking the 
same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and other essential 
institutions. The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subver-
sive activities .... "3 Devlin, in turn, provoked a retort from the legal philosopher H. L.A. Hart, 
who defended both the committee's recommendation and Millian liberalism more generally. 
Indeed, Hart seems to be the one who gave legal moralism its name: "In England in the last few 
years the question whether the criminal law should be used to punish immorality 'as such' has 
acquired a new practical importance; for there has, I think, been a revival there of what might 
be termed legal moralism" (Hart 1963: 6; emphasis in original). 
This revival was not only something that Hart deplored but something he did much to 
discourage. Among legal philosophers, at least, "legal moralism" became associated in the 1960s 
and '70s with a smothering imposition of social norms that would deprive individuals of the 
essential freedom of self-expression. More recently, however, such prominent legal theorists as 
Michael Moore and Antony Duff have proclaimed their adherence to legal moralism, while 
others have tendered it a grudging respect.4 Two considerations seem to lie behind this shift.The 
first is the growing appreciation of the expressive or communicative function of criminal punish-
ment, and the second is the recognition that morality may be entwined with the criminal law 
in a more com'plicated fashion than Devlin's arguments had suggested. 
In 1965, in the midst of the Hart-Devlin debate,Joel Feinberg published an article that raised 
the first of these considerations. In that article Feinberg drew attention to a characteristic of 
punishment that distinguishes it from other penalties. That characteristic, he argued, "is a cer-
tain expressive function: punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of 
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either 
of the punishing authority himself or of those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted" 
(Feinberg 1970: 98). Following Feinberg's lead, other legal philosophers have taken this expres-
sive, reprobative, or condemnatory function to be a key feature of legal punishment, includ-
ing some who have argued that the function is better described as "communicative,'' because 
"communication involves, as expression need not, a reciprocal and rational engagement" on the 
part of those who are punished (Duff2001: 79; see also Hampton 1992; Morris 1981: 274; and 
Pettit 2015: 135). Rather than simply expressing or venting society's anger, in other words, the 
43 
Richard Dagger 
aim of punishment is to communicate both social disapproval and the reasons for holding the 
wrongdoer's actions to be deserving of punishment. Moreover, this communication should pro-
ceed in ways that will help to restore him to good standing in society. 
Whether we call it the expressive or the communicative function, the point is that pun-
ishment and criminalization are tied to the moral censure-to "resentment and indignation" 
and "judgments of disapproval and reprobation," in Feinberg's terms-that the offender's 
unjust actions provoke. Punishment certainly has its "conventional" aspect as a matter of 
"[p]ublic condemnation," according to Feinberg (98, 114), for it is an expression ofa social 
reaction to a public offense, not a disinterested reaction to an abstract moral wrong. One 
cannot take this view of punishment, however, without also taking the view that the crim-
inal law is somehow bound up with morality. To be sure, it is possible to hold that murder, 
robbery, rape, and other central examples of criminal wrongdoing are wrong not because 
they are immoral but because they are harmful, with "harm" defined in a way that excludes 
moral considerations.5 But even those who are tempted by such a view must concede that 
the expression or communication of social resentment and indignation through punishment 
involves at least an implicit appeal to justice and morality. If we are to regard punishment as a 
form of moral censure, in other words, we must also regard the criminal law as upholding in 
some sense the moral standards of the polity. In that respect, the expressive or communicative 
aspect of punishment lends support to legal moralism. 6 
That is not to say, though, that anyone who conceives of punishment in this way must also 
conclude that the criminal law either is or should be a straightforward reflection of the con-
ventional morality of a society. The relationship between law and morality-indeed, morality 
itself-is more complicated than that. Hart himself pointed in this direction by distinguishing 
"the morality actually accepted and shared by a given social group," or "positive morality," 
from "critical morality"-that is, "the general moral principles used in the criticism of actual 
social institutions, including positive morality" (Hart 1963: 20). Positive morality might well 
endorse, for example, "morals legislation" proscribing "vice crimes" that are not obviously 
harmful to anyone, including those who engage in those "vices." Devlin and the early advo-
cates of legal moralism seemed content with this conclusion, but theirs is not the kind of 
legal moralism its current advocates are propounding.7 As Moore takes pains to point out, 
a circumscribed conception of morality and a presumption in favor of liberty, among other 
considerations, has led him to a highly qualified form oflegal moralism that is no less hesitant 
than Mill and Hart to reject much of "morals legislation." Immoral actions should indeed 
count as crimes, Moore insists, but his "spare view" of morality leaves no room for "duties to 
others with respect to many of the items about which customary morality so fusses and fumes, 
such as sex" (Moore 2008: 32). 
Duff reaches a similar conclusion in part for similar reasons, but also by way of the tradi-
tional distinction between civil and criminal law (Duff 2014: 222-24). Both branches of law 
are concerned with wrongs, but one has to do with private and the other with public wrongs. 
Someone who breaches a contract, for example, is ordinarily guilty of wrongdoing, but the law, 
regarding it as a private wrong, leaves the aggrieved party to decide whether to bring suit in civil 
court or not. Someone arrested for burglary or some other crime, on the other hand, is liable 
to prosecution by the state or commonwealth regardless of whether the victim wants to press 
charges. In the case of a crime, in other words, the wrong is not only to the immediate victim 
or victims but in some sense to the public as a whole. Hence, the concern of criminal law with 
public rather than private wrongs. 
Of course, whether a wrong is private or public is not always a clear-cut matter. Some legal 
systems regard defamation of character as a public wrong and thus a crime, for example, while 
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others take it to be a private wrong (Dagger 2009: 162-65). Some might even hold that breach 
of contract is properly a criminal offense because, by weakening trust in the security of con-
tracts, it constitutes a public wrong. Whatever one thinks of these particular cases, the point is 
that some guidance is necessary if we are to find a principled way of distinguishing private from 
public wrongs. Duff suggests that such guidance is to be found in political rather than moral 
theory and particularly in the political theory of republicanism. His remarks in this connection 
are brief, though, and require the kind of elaboration I try to provide in the following sections 
of this paper (Duff2007: 50, 53; 2014: 222-24). For the present, the important point is that Duff 
takes the distinction between private and public wrongs to lead to a "modest" form of legal 
moralism that eschews the "kind of moral witch hunt" in which "we must collectively seek out 
wrongdoing (of the appropriate kind) in order to make sure that it is criminalized and punished" 
(Duff2014: 222). 
In this respect, as I have noted, Duff's conclusion is much the same as Moore's. There are 
differences between them, however, as Duff observes while developing a useful taxonomy of 
the varieties of legal moralism. First he distinguishes between negative and positive versions 
oflegal moralism; and then, within the latter category, he distinguishes modest from ambitious 
forms. According to negative legal moralism, only immoral actions or activities should be 
outlawed; according to the positive version, the immorality of an action or activity is always a 
reason-but not always a conclusive reason-to outlaw it (Duff2014: 218; also Duff2012: 179-204, 
esp. 186). The distinction, however, is not a dichotomy, for one may accept both negative and 
positive legal moralism, as Duff says both he and Moore do. The difference between them is 
that Moore takes the ambitious view that "criminal law must punish all and only those who 
are morally culpable in the doing of some morally wrongful action" (1997: 35), while Duff 
holds the modest view that "only certain kinds of moral wrongdoing are even in principle 
worthy of criminalization ... " (2014: 222). 8 In particular, as we have seen, he argues that the 
proper concern of the criminal law is with public wrongs, for "the criminal law is not simply 
the moral law given institutional form," as it would have to be were it to reflect the ambitious 
version of positive legal moralism (Duff 2014: 223). 
Duff's case for a modest version of positive legal moralism is both powerful and persuasive. 
Nevertheless, three difficult questions remain to be answered: (1) How firm is the distinction 
between public and private wrongs? (2) Are such paradigmatic crimes as murder, rape, and rob-
bery really public wrongs? And (3) are mala prohibita offenses, such as speeding or driving without 
a license, really moral wrongs? Duff and his sometime co-author, Sandra Marshall, have provided 
answers to these questions, but fully adequate answers are only available through a full-fledged 
embrace of the civic morality of republicanism. To appreciate why that is so requires a brief 
consideration of the answers they have ventured. 
The first question is important because failure to establish a firm distinction between 
private and public wrongs could lead to the kind of ambitious legal moralism that Moore 
embraces but Duff eschews; it could even lead, in the absence of Moore's circumscribed 
conception of morality, to a pure and decidedly immodest form oflegal moralism.9 Marshall 
and Duff open themselves to the latter possibility by resting their argument on the idea of 
shared wrongs, with crime taken to be "socially proscribed wrongdoing" (Marshall and Duff 
1998:13). This understanding leads to a position uncomfortably close to Devlin's claim that 
society has as much reason to defend itself against immorality as against treason: "We must 
ask [write Marshall and Duff] ... what kinds of wrong should be seen as wrongs against 'us'; 
and this is to ask which values are (which should be) so central to a community's identity 
and self-understanding ... that actions which attack or flout those values are not merely 
individual matters which the individual victim should pursue for herself, but attacks on the 
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community" (Marshall and Duff 1998: 21-22). So stated, one could conclude that acts that 
apparently "attack or flout" a community's dominant values concerning sex, religion, or 
ethnic homogeneity are "attacks on the community" to be counted as "socially proscribed 
wrongdoing." If the aim is to advance a modestly positive form oflegal moralism, then Duff 
(and Marshall) will need to find some less communitarian way to distinguish public from 
private wrongs. The civic morality of republicanism, as I shall argue below, is both available 
and appropriate. 
The second and third questions both trade on the familiar distinction between actions wrong 
in themselves (ma/a in se) and those that are wrong only because they are prohibited (ma/a pro-
hibita). In the case of paradigmatic crimes such as rape, robbery, and murder, it is easy to see how, 
as ma/a in se, they are morally wrong. The problem is to show how they constitute public wrongs. 
In contrast to perjury, tax evasion, and treason, which are by definition wrongs to the public, the 
paradigmatic crimes are wrongs to individuals.Again, Marshall and Duff have a response, which 
is to argue that such crimes are not only wrongs done to their individual victims:"an attack on a 
member of the group is thus an attack on the group-on their shared values and their common 
good .... '[H]er' wrong is also 'our' wrong insofar as we identify ourselves with her" (Marshall 
and Duff 1998: 20). But this prompts the further question of how the wrongs are shared or com-
mon. Is it a matter of choice or identification-of what "we" choose as our values and mutual 
concerns, or of how "we" define our values and ourselves as a group? Here again, I shall argue, 
republican theory provides the adequate answer. 
The third question-how to account for mala prohibita as moral wrongs-arises because 
the proscribed acts or activities may be obviously public but not obviously immoral. Speeding, 
driving without a license, and drinking alcohol in a city park provide clear examples. If relevant 
statutes or ordinances proscribe them, all three are legally wrong even though none of them 
seems to be intrinsically immoral. But if ma/a prohibita need not be moral wrongs, then immoral-
ity cannot be the necessary condition of criminality that negative legal moralists-and negative 
plus positive legal moralists, such as Duff and Moore-take it to be. In response to this challenge 
to legal moralism, Duff has drawn a distinction between pre-criminal and pre-legal wrong. To use 
his example, failure to comply with tax laws can only be morally wrong if there are such things 
as tax laws; there is thus no pre-legal wrong of failing to pay taxes. Once tax laws do exist, 
however, failure to comply with them, ceteris paribus, counts as a morally wrongful failure to do 
one's civic duty. When other laws make a crime of failing to pay one's taxes, they make a crime 
of an action that was pre-criminally, but not pre-legally, a moral wrong (Duff2014: 219; see also 
Duff2012: 198-204,and Duff2007: 91-2).The idea, then, is that actions that do not seem to be 
morally wrong in themselves, such as speeding or driving on the left-hand side of the street, can 
become wrongful when relevant laws are promulgated, such as traffic laws. Something that was 
not wrong pre-legally thus becomes a wrong pre-criminally-that is, even before it is designated 
as a crime or infraction-which is consistent with the legal moralist's claim that only immoral 
actions should be made crimes. 
This distinction between pre-legal and pre-criminal is, I believe, both sound and to the point. 
It fails, however, to account for the moral element of the pre-legal wrongfulness that Duff has 
identified. Paying taxes may be a legal duty, and failure to pay them a legal (but pre-criminal) 
wrong, but what makes it a moral duty, the violation of which counts as a moral wrong? Duff 
appeals in passing to republicanism to forge the link between legal and moral wrongfulness, 
referring to civic duties and using the language of fair shares (Duff 2014: 219, 222, 227; also 
Duff 2012: 203), but these are references and appeals that must be supported by an account of 
republicanism as a matter of fair play. That account I shall now try to provide, beginning with a 
brief synopsis of republican political and legal theory. 
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Part two: Republicanism as fair play 
Perhaps the simplest way to distill the leading themes of its long and complicated history is to say 
that republicanism is largely a matter of publicity and self-government. That republicanism involves 
publicity is evident from the term's derivation from the Latin res publica, the business of the pub-
lic. To the republican, government and law are not the purview of a single ruler or a small set 
of rulers, who may dispose of people and territory as if they were the ruler's personal property. 
On the republican view, government and law are the people's business, to be conducted on the 
people's terms (Pettit 2012). For that reason, republicanism also involves publicity in the sense 
of openness. That is, the public's business is to be conducted in public, open to the scrutiny and 
criticism of members of the public. 
Quentin Skinner's and Philip Pettit's influential writings have brought the second feature 
of republicanism, self-government, to the center of attention in recent years (esp. Skinner 1998 
and Pettit 1997). Pettit's contributions are especially important here, for he has explicitly con-
nected republican freedom to the concerns of criminal law (esp. Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 
and Pettit 2015). His conception of freedom as non-domination stops short of where I think 
republican freedom takes us, which is to freedom understood as autonomy (Dagger 2005), but 
the essential point is that republicans believe freedom is more than a matter of being left alone. 
Whether regarded as freedom from domination or as autonomy, republican freedom requires 
self-government under, by, and through the law. Hence the proclamation, from Roman antiquity 
to modern times, that a republic is an empire oflaws, not of men. That is, the republic is the rule 
of free citizens who govern themselves through laws that they enact or ratify, if not directly, then 
through their elected representatives. 
How, though, do these republican concerns, publicity and self-government, bear on criminal 
law or legal moralism? Part of the answer is that together they underpin the republican commit-
ment to the rule oflaw; another is that they represent a civic morality grounded in the principle 
of fair play. 
With regard to the rule of law, the republican element is evident in all three themes that 
Brian Tamanaha has discerned in the rule oflaw (2004: ch. 9). First, the rule oflaw entails a com-
mitment to limited government. No one is to hold absolute or unchecked power, and the aims 
of those in positions of authority must be limited to the service of the public good. Second, the 
rule oflaw is, in the old republican formula, the rule of law, not of men-not, that is, rule by the 
arbitrary will or whims of those in power. Finally, in order to satisfy the two previous conditions, 
the rule oflaw also requires legality. For a rule or ordinance to be a law, in other words, it must 
meet certain formal requirements regardless of what its substance is. Thus, among other things, 
a law must be general in its application, must be made known to the public, and must not con-
tradict itself or other laws.10 All of these themes, in short, bear traces of the republican concern 
for publicity and self-government. In the case oflegality, moreover, there is a clear connection 
to the idea of fair play. For it is simply not fair to hold people accountable to "laws," or expect 
them to "play by the rules," when these people have no way of knowing what the rules are; nor 
is it fair to subject them to "laws" that apply to some but not to others, or that simultaneously 
require and prohibit an action. 
The rule oflaw, then, is linked not only to republicanism but also to the sense of fair play. Nor 
is this simply a coincidence. Implicitly if not explicitly, republicans are committed to the moral 
principle of fair play, which forms the basis of republicanism's civic morality. This connection 
to fair play admittedly is not a feature of standard accounts of republicanism, but I shall try to 
demonstrate why it should be in three steps. The first is to define the principle of fair play and to 
identify its key features; the second is to show how this principle connects to the main concerns 
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of republicanism; and the third is to explain how following the principle of fair play leads to a 
civic morality that underpins a modest form of positive legal moralism. 
Step one: The principle of fair play 
Fairness and fair play are ancient concepts, grounded in widely and firmly held intuitions about 
right and wrong conduct. Straightforward formulations of the principle of fair play, however, 
are little more than half a century old. The first appeared in 1955, before the Hart-Devlin 
debate, in H. L.A. Hart's" Are 711ere Any Natural RiRhts?" As Hart there wrote, "when a number of 
persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who 
have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those 
who have benefited by their submission" (Hart 1970 [1955]: 70). Hart did not refer explicitly to 
"fairness" or "fair play" in this passage, but John Rawls did in his 1964 essay, "LeRal Ob/(!(ations 
and the Duty ef Fair Play." There Rawls explained "the principle of fair play" in this way. 
Suppose there is a mutually beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation, and that 
the advantages it yields can only be obtained if everyone, or nearly everyone, cooperates. 
Suppose further that cooperation requires a certain sacrifice from each person, or at least 
involves a certain restriction of his liberty. Suppose finally that the benefits produced by 
cooperation are, up to a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation is unstable in 
the sense that if any one person knows that all (or nearly all) of the others will continue to 
do their part, he will still be able to share a gain from the scheme even if he does not do 
his part. Under these conditions a person who has accepted the benefits of the scheme is 
bound by a duty of fair play to do his part and not to take advantage of the free benefit by 
not cooperating. 
(Rawls 1964: 9-10; see also Rawls 1999: 96) 
Taking Hart's and Rawls's formulations together, we can identify four key elements in the 
principle of fair play. First, the principle applies to cooperative practices; second, these practices are 
governed by rules or laws; third, these rule-governed practices are subject to collective-action prob-
lems; and fourth, coercion is necessary to assure the people engaged in such a practice that their 
compliance will not be exploited or wasted. None of these points is novel, but they do require 
brief explanation. 
Regarding the first point, the principle of fair play applies only to those activities involving a 
cooperative practice. Those who find themselves in a street fight or anything that counts as a "free 
for all," such as a Hobbesian state of nature, are not engaged in a cooperative practice in which 
the participants have a duty of fair play to one another. Cooperative practices must be mutually 
beneficial, as Rawls said, for otherwise there would be no point to the cooperation. But they 
also must be in some way burdensome. A group of musicians must cooperate if they are to 
play together, but their playing will not constitute a cooperative enterprise if it is all benefit to 
them and no burden. There must be some hardship-at least some restriction of their liberty, 
in Hart's terms-that is necessary to the achievement of the good or benefit the participants 
aim to achieve. In the case of the musicians, there must be occasions on which one or more of 
them would rather not play a certain piece or would prefer not to rehearse so often or so long. 
Something similar is true of all cooperative practices. 
Cooperative practices are also ongoing. They may begin with spontaneous, unrehearsed 
activity, but they will need rules or laws to continue. That is the second key element of cooper-
ative practices that raise considerations of fair play. In some cases these rules are nothing more 
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than informal and perhaps unspoken norms. In a small group, when the point of the activity and 
the need for cooperation are obvious, the rule may be nothing more than "You do your part, 
I'll do mine, and no shirking." In larger groups, and especially in those in which the cooperation 
is supposed to extend well into the future, formal rules that specify the nature of the required 
cooperation will be necessary. 
The third feature of a cooperative practice is that it is susceptible to collective-action problems. 
As Hart's and Rawls's formulations indicate, the principle of fair play applies to cooperative enter-
prises that produce public or collective goods-that is, goods that are indivisible, non-excludable, 
and non-rival, so that one person's enjoyment of a good does not deprive another of an equal 
opportunity to enjoy it. Such goods, of course, are not likely to require universal cooperation to 
produce, as the standard examples of national defense and clean air attest. They are, instead, goods 
that non-cooperators may enjoy as fully as those whose cooperative efforts produce the goods 
in question. Cooperative practices are thus open to free riders who hope to benefit from others' 
cooperative labors and sacrifices without themselves bearing those burdens. Cooperative prac-
tices typically can tolerate some free riders, but at some point free riding will lead to the collapse 
of the enterprise.That is why coercive measures are usually necessary ifthe practice is to survive. 
Coercion or some other means of preventing or punishing free riders thus speaks to the 
fourth fair-play element of cooperative practices, the need for assurance. Even people who are 
willing to make cooperative sacrifices will be unwise to do so when their sacrifices will be in 
vain. It makes no sense, for example, to pay membership dues to a club or organization when 
few of the other supposed members are doing so. Cooperative practices must find some way 
to assure those who would willingly cooperate that their cooperation will not be wasted. Such 
people will quite happily acknowledge that they have a duty of fairness to contribute to the sup-
port and maintenance of the cooperative practice, but they must be given security against those 
who would take unfair advantage of their cooperative good nature and endanger the practice 
with their attempts at free riding. 
This analysis of fair play and cooperative practices bears on political and legal philosophy 
because Hart and Rawls, among others, believe that we should regard political societies and legal 
systems as cooperative enterprises. For Rawls, in fact, the idea" of society as a fair system of cooper-
ation over time, from one generation to the next;' is "the fundamental organizing idea" of his the-
ory of justice as fairness (Rawls 2005: 15). To be sure, some political regimes have been so despotic, 
tyrannical, oppressive, and exploitative that they could not be properly described as cooperative 
enterprises. All political regimes rely on some degree of cooperation, however, and many of them 
have been cooperative enough to qualify as the mutually beneficial and reasonably just schemes 
of social cooperation that Rawls took to warrant duties of fair play. That is why the principle of 
fair play has found its chief employment in discussions of political obligation and the justification 
of punishment. In both cases the arguments are controversial, but the underlying idea is that the 
citizens of a polity that may be reasonably regarded as a cooperative venture have a general duty to 
obey its laws. Those who do not comply with this duty make themselves liable to punishment by 
the legal authorities. Other things being equal, in short, fair play requires obedience to the law and 
justifies punishing those whose disobedience violates the duty of fair play.11 
Two further points remain before turning to the connection of fair play to republicanism. 
The first is that the duty of fair play is something that every member of a cooperative practice 
owes to the other members, or at least to those whose cooperative efforts help to support and 
sustain the practice. We often speak of duties or obligations that are owed to "the state" or "the 
law," but that is simply a short-hand way, according to the fair-play view, to refer to obligations 
owed to one another as cooperating members of the practice-to the law-abiding members of 
the polity, for instance. The second is that the principle of fair play has a critical and aspirational 
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aspect. Because the principle applies only to cooperative practices, it requires us to subject 
political regimes to scrutiny in order to determine whether they truly qualify. If they fall well 
short of the ideal of a cooperative practice--if they are thoroughly oppressive and exploitative--
then there will be no duty of fair play to comply in general with their ordinances. In other cases 
the question will be whether a regime is cooperative enough to qualify as a cooperative practice. 
For that matter, even the best regimes will not completely realize the ideal of a fully cooperative 
practice. There will always be something further to aspire to if a body politic is to be a mutually 
beneficial and just scheme of social cooperation.And that is why the principle of fair play has a 
critical and aspirational aspect. 
Step two: Fair ploy and the republic 
The most direct way to mark the connection between fair play and republicanism is to attend to 
a word often used to render res publica into English. That word is commonwealth. The republic is 
the public's business, as we have seen, and the weal, wealth, or well-being of the public is a matter 
of common concern. It is not the business of one or a few, nor of a faction or sect, but of the 
people in their common capacity as citizens. If the republic truly is to succeed, the people must 
cooperate, as citizens, to ensure that it provides the public goods of order and security under law. 
They must bear the burdens involved in establishing and maintaining the rule of law, in other 
words, in order to enjoy its benefits. 
Like other cooperative practices, then, the republic is a rule-governed enterprise. Cicero 
made that point two millennia ago when he defined the republic as "an assemblage of some size 
associated with one another through agreement on law and community of interest" (1999: 18). 
In order to provide the rule oflaw, however, the citizens of the republic must cooperate by pay-
ing taxes and bearing other burdens; but because the rule oflaw is a public good, some citizens 
will be tempted to become free riders. In the face of this temptation, the republic must find 
ways to assure those who are willing to bear their shares of the cooperative enterprise that their 
efforts will not be futile. 
This is to say that republics rely on die spirit of fair play. Of course, they must employ 
coercion against those who would take unfair advantage of other citizens; but coercion can-
not by itself generate the spirit of fair play. The threat of coercion may lead to a grudging 
acceptance of the need to do one's fair share by paying taxes and obeying other laws that one 
would rather disobey. But republics need more than grudging acceptance. They need citizens 
who are willing to put the public good ahead of their personal desires not because they fear 
coercion but because they want to do their duty. To put the point in time-honored republican 
terms, republics need to foster civic virtue. And civic virtue, I am suggesting, is largely a matter 
of fair play. 
To reinforce this point, we should consider what the classical republicans took to be the 
antithesis and enemy of civic virtue--namely, corruption. Corruption takes various forms, but 
at bottom it is a matter of acting selfishly rather than civically-of putting one's interests and 
desires ahead of the public good that one shares with one's fellow citizens. If civic virtue is 
largely a matter of fair play, then corruption, or civic vice, is largely a matter of refusing to play 
fair. Two terms frequently linked in republican discourse, ambition and avarice, are instructive in 
this regard.Ambition, to republicans, is the overweening desire for personal power that threatens 
the stability of the republic and the freedom of its citizens. Avarice is the desire for personal 
wealth that blinds some people to the duty to contribute to the public enterprise and may even 
lead them to steal from it. Both are failures to act with proper regard to the rights and interests 
of one's fellow citizens and therefore violations of the duty of fair play. 12 
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By saying this, I do not mean to suggest that public corruption is no worse than the failure to 
play fair in a game. The ambitious man who tries to seize power by overthrowing a republic is far 
worse than someone who cheats while playing tennis, as is the avaricious woman who betrays 
the public trust by embezzling public funds. But that simply means that some violations of fair 
play are worse than others, just as some corrupt actions are worse than others. The point here is 
that surrendering to avarice or ambition counts as corruption because it is a failure of fair play. 
It is also a violation of the republican commitment to publicity. 
The same point holds with regard to republicanism's second leading feature, self-government. 
For republicans, I have noted, to be free is to be self-governing under, by, and through the law. 
To be free in this way, however, requires more than forbearance or lack of coercion or interfer-
ence from others. It requires others to do their part in maintaining the rule of law that makes 
self-government possible; and this is a matter of fair play. 13 Freedom under law thus requires the 
citizens to bear the burdens of legal cooperation so that all of them may enjoy the benefits of 
self-government. This is in large part a matter of obeying the law. Laws do not write themselves, 
though, and republican citizens bear some responsibility for determining what the laws are to be. 
They may also have some duty to enforce the law, as they do in countries that require citizens 
to serve on juries. If citizens are to be self-governing, in short, they owe it to one another to 
pay some attention to public affairs and cast at least an occasional vote for a representative. This 
is a matter of civic virtue, but it is also a matter of freedom as self-government. With regard to 
both elements of republicanism, in sum, self-government as well as publicity, fair play is a crucial 
ingredient. 
To clarify this point, it may be helpful to draw a contrast with another conception of self-
government. According to this other conception, freedom or self-government is mainly a mat-
ter of being left alone to do as one wants without restraint. With regard to law, this means 
that self-government amounts to freedom from law or, as Hobbes put the point, the liberties of 
subjects depend largely on "the silence of the Law" (1985 (1651]:271). The republican view of 
self-government stands in contrast to this conception because, as I have said, it takes freedom to 
be something achieved under, or through, or by the law. In terms that Pettit frequently invokes, 
the difference is between "the freedom of the heath"-that is, the liberty of life in a lawless 
wilderness-and "the freedom of the city"-that is, the liberty of life in a civilized society 
under the rule oflaw (e.g., Pettit 1989). Self-government in the latter, republican sense is to be 
understood not as freedom from restraint, but as the liberty possible under shared government; 
for the freedom one can enjoy as a member of a republic is as much a matter of interdependence as 
it is of independence. Self-government under and through the rule law, or of restraints that people 
impose upon themselves, is in this way intimately connected with cooperative fair play. 
Step three: Implications of fair play for republicanism 
What follows for criminal law theory from this fair-play conception of republicanism? The 
answer is a modest form of legal moralism, as I shall explain in Part Three. It is necessary to 
begin, though, by considering briefly two broad implications of the fair-play conception of 
republicanism. The first is that republics must cultivate the spirit of fair play among their citizens; 
the second is that republics must play fair with their members. 
Implications of the first kind begin with the reminder that we cannot simply assume that 
citizens will be imbued with the spirit of cooperative fair play. That assumption might be war-
ranted in a small, tightly knit community, but not in anything as large as a republican polity. 
Indeed, one of the principal challenges for modern republics is to help their members to appre-
ciate the cooperative foundations of their political and legal systems.That is a difficult task when 
51 
Richard Dagger 
political and legal authority are likely to seem remote from people's lives and more coercive than 
cooperative in their bearing. There are ways to meet this challenge, however, with civic educa-
tion probably the most widely accepted among republicans. Especially important in this regard 
is education in the rights and responsibilities of citizens under the rule of law. 
The second broad implication of conceiving of republicanism as fair play is that the republic 
itself must be worthy of cooperative, fair-playing citizens. If people are to think of themselves as 
participants in a cooperative venture, and therefore subject to a duty of fair play, then the practice 
must treat its members fairly. Taxation again provides an example. Government and the rule of 
law are public goods, and taxes are part of the burden we bear to provide them. But what if the 
tax collectors are filling their pockets with our tax payments? Or what if relatively few people 
are paying their full and fair shares of the tax burden? In these circumstances, there seems to be 
no duty-and certainly none based on fair play-to pay one's taxes. For that duty to be in force, 
the tax system itself must operate fairly. The same point holds for other legal institutions. We 
simply cannot expect people to play fair when they are not themselves treated fairly. 
Pressing this point farther, republics must see to it that their members have good reason to 
think of themselves as parts of a commonwealth. Among other things, that means that economic 
inequality will be a subject of concern. There is no single republican formula that determines 
how much inequality of wealth and property is tolerable, but Rousseau grasped the essential 
point when he declared, in the footnote that ends Book I of his Social Contract, that everyone 
must have something and no one too much. Everyone must have enough, that is, to live as a 
self-governing citizen free from dependence upon those whose superabundant resources put 
them in position to dominate others. 14 
Beyond economic considerations, treating people fairly within a republic involves treating 
them as citizens. Their individual characteristics-sex, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and 
so on-are irrelevant. The important consideration is whether a person is subject to, and will 
contribute to, the republic understood as a cooperative practice. If so, then that person deserves 
the same concern and respect under law as every other citizen; but she owes that same concern 
and respect, as a matter of fair play, to her fellow citizens. This is in some respects a social matter, 
for it relates to the attitudes of citizens and "their spirit of cooperation. But it is also a legal issue 
insofar as the law must be concerned with fostering the spirit of fair play if the rule of law is 
to survive. 
Part three: Republican legal moralism 
Criminals, though, do not play fair. Thieves, for example, want others to respect their property, 
but they do not respect the property of their victims. To be sure, we must make allowances 
for situations in which the criminal law itself is unjust, either in what it proscribes or in how 
it is enforced. The burdens of fair play fall upon polities and legal systems too; that is part of 
republicanism's critical and aspirational aspect. When a polity is reasonably regarded as a coop-
erative enterprise, however, we can say that criminals violate the civic morality of republicanism 
by taking unfair advantage of their fellow citizens, whose cooperation makes the rule of law 
possible. In that sense, all crimes are crimes of unfairness. This claim strikes some not only as 
counterintuitive but false, despite the defenses of it I have offered elsewhere (1993 and 2008; but 
cf. Duff 2008). Here I shall try to extend and strengthen that defense by way oflegal moralism. 
From the standpoint oflegal moralism, the question of whether to declare an act or activity 
to be criminal means that we must begin, at least conceptually, with the suspicion that the act 
or activity is likely to be immoral. From the standpoint of republican and modest legal mor-
alism, we must also have reason to believe that the act or activity constitutes not only a moral 
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but a public wrong. To make the case for criminalization, we must therefore be able to provide 
satisfactory responses to the three questions raised earlier concerning Duff's (and Marshall's) 
modest legal moralism. 
The first question-how firm is the distinction between private and public wrongs?-poses a 
difficulty for Duff (and Marshall), I have argued, because the attempt to draw the distinction by 
defining public wrongs as shared wrongs implies a communitarian position that seems uncomfort-
ably close to Devlin's version of legal moralism. For an answer more congenial to modest legal 
moralism, we should ask instead whether the putative wrong inhibits or endangers the rule oflaw 
as a cooperative practice. Lying and promise breaking, for example, will not in general have this 
effect. Indeed, were we to try to bring the law to bear on every lie or broken promise, we would 
almost surely bring about the collapse of the rule of law. Some lies, though, such as perjury and 
false accusations, are clearly threats to the rule oflaw. The same holds for some kinds of promise 
breaking, such as breach of contract, that are typically counted as civil rather than criminal wrongs. 
Whether such forms of lying and promise breaking should be subject to the criminal law will 
then depend largely on the question of whether civil law provides suitable remedies. If it seems to, 
as in the case of breach of contract, then the wrong should be regarded as a private matter to be 
left to individuals to pursue through the civil law. If the offense is on the order of fraud, though, 
then the offender is guilty of an intentional violation of fair play and thus guilty of a public wrong 
deserving of the communicative or condemnatory force of the criminal law. 
The second question-are such paradigmatic crimes as murder, rape, and robbery really public 
wrongs?-poses another difficulty for the conception of crimes as shared wrongs. In this case, 
the problem is to explain how the wrong is shared. How is it, that is, that the murder of Jones 
or the robbery of Smith constitutes a wrong the rest of us share? To say, as Marshall and Duff 
do, that the sharing is the result of our identification with the victims-of seeing the attacks on 
them as somehow attacks on us-is to invoke notions of sympathy and community that may 
prove embarrassing. For suppose that Jones and Smith are not-for reasons of race, religion, lan-
guage, or numerous other factors-persons with whom "we" fully identify as members of"our" 
community. In that case, is the murder of]ones or the robbery of Smith really a shared wrong? If 
it ought to be so regarded, as Marshall and Duff no doubt believe, then we will have to have some 
reason other than identification or fellow-feeling to account for these offenses as public wrongs. 
In these cases, again, the civic morality of fair play provides the reason. Anything that makes 
it difficult or impossible to play one's part as a self-governing participant in the cooperative 
practice of the polity counts as a public wrong-and hence is a candidate for criminalization. 
Murder, rape, robbery, arson, and the other paradigmatic crimes fall into this category. When 
the victims of such crimes survive, they are often crippled, physically or otherwise, in ways that 
inhibit their participation in the polity. Nor are the immediate or direct victims the only ones 
who suffer from these crimes, which bring in their wake not only the attitudinal costs associated 
with fear and the sense of injustice but also insurance and avoidance costs for the secondary or 
indirect victims of crime. These are the reasons even the paradigmatic crimes are as much public 
as private wrongs. 
Finally, the third question-how to account for ma/a prohibita as moral wrongs-is important 
because any theory of criminalization that claims to be grounded in legal moralism must be able 
to show that mala prohibita are not merely legal offenses. Duff's distinction between pre-legal and 
pre-criminal wrongs goes some way toward meeting this challenge, as we have seen, but it does 
not itself account for the moral wrongfulness of mala prohibita. To do this, as his gestures toward 
republicanism indicate, the distinction must be grounded in a political theory that provides a 
credible basis for invoking civic qua moral duty. What Duff misses, though, is the critical impor-
tance of the principle of fair play to republicanism. 
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That this principle is linked to the justification of ma/a prohibita is not surprising. Indeed, it 
is difficult to see what is wrong with many of the prohibited activities other than the unfair-
ness of those who engage in them. To return to the example of tax evasion, it is hardly obvious 
that any harm will result from the average citizen's failure to pay his taxes. Other things being 
equal, though, his failure to pay is morally wrong because he is taking unfair advantage of those 
whose cooperation enables him to enjoy, as a free rider, the rule oflaw and other public goods. 
That is why even those who doubt the validity of the fair-play account of ma/a in se offenses, 
including Duff, often acknowledge the account's plausibility when applied to ma/a prohibita 
(Duff 1986: 211) .15 What must be recognized, however, is the vital role that this principle plays 
in republican legal and political theory. 
Conclusion: Legal moralism and republican virtue 
Recognizing this role, and elaborating it, will further advance two aims of fundamental impor-
tance to criminal law and justice. One of these is to strengthen the case for legal moralism. 
As I have argued above, republican civic morality provides the underpinning for a version of 
legal moralism that is both modest and attractive-and attractive largely because of its modesty. 
Legal moralism of this kind allows us to capture the intuition that criminal acts are morally 
wrong without turning criminal law into the legal instrument of a polity's conventional moral-
ity or licensing "the kind of moral witch hunt" that Duff and others have rightly deplored 
(Duff 2014: 222). According to a modest and republican form oflegal moralism, criminal acts 
are public wrongs, deserving of public condemnation, because they are immoral at least in the 
sense of violating the spirit of fair play and endangering the cooperative practice of the polity, 
including the rule oflaw. 
Recognizing and elaborating the role of fair play within republicanism should also advance 
republican legal moralism, and republican theory more broadly, by deflecting concerns about 
the republican emphasis on virtue. Because of its association with civic virtue, republicanism is 
sometimes taken to be a threat to individual rights and liberties-and especially to rights and 
liberties that protect activities at odds with conventional conceptions of virtuous conduct (Gey 
1993; Goodin 2003).Adding republicanism to legal moralism, according to this view, is simply 
to encourage moral witch hunts and other attempts to stamp out vice. When republican virtue 
is understood in terms of the civic morality of fair play, however, these worries should disappear. 
So understood, republican virtue is fundamentally a matter of playing one's part as a citizen 
engaged in the cooperative practice of the polity, and playing this part includes respecting the 
rights and liberties and tolerating the personal preferences, orientations, and activities of every-
one who is also doing her civic duty. Republican legal moralism will indeed endorse attempts to 
suppress vice by means of criminal law, but those attempts will aim at violations of civic morality 
rather than the standard "vice crimes." 
This is not to say that republican legal moralism will neatly or swiftly dispose of every contro-
versy concerning what should or should not be deemed a crime. It does, however, provide essential 
guidance. If an activity or action poses no threat to the republic as a cooperative practice, then it 
cannot be considered civically vicious, and it should not be proscribed. Those who would make a 
crime of some form of sexual activity between consenting adults would thus have to show that the 
activity in question poses a serious threat to the polity as a cooperative practice. That case, I take 
it, would be difficult to make. In other cases, though, the judgment will not be as easy to reach. 
One could argue, for instance, that the production and/ or consumption of any drug that renders 
people incapable of fair play or of carrying out their duties of civility should be a crime. Couched 
in those terms, the proposal is perfectly acceptable under the republican version oflegal moralism. 
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But those who are charged with determining what is to count as a crime would then have to make 
an informed judgment as to which drugs, if any, do in fact have these propensities. Once they have 
identified such drugs, if any, they would then have to make the further determination of whether 
the criminal sanction is the appropriate way to deal with the problem and, ifit is, whether a blanket 
prohibition or a more limited response is better. In the case of alcohol, there is little doubt that its 
consumption at some point inhibits civility and the spirit of fair play. Laws against public drunken-
ness and enhanced punishment for those who harm or endanger others while drunk, though, seem 
likely to address the problem more effectively than outright prohibition of the production, sale, 
and/or consumption of alcohol. Nor would such criminal laws place an unfair burden on anyone, 
neither those who fail to play fair because of their drunkenness nor those who consume alcohol 
without endangering others or otherwise threatening fair play within the polity. Extending this 
republican reasoning to drugs that are widely proscribed at present would almost certainly result 
in a dramatic reduction in drug laws, with corresponding reductions in drug crimes and in prison 
populations, especially in the United States. 
The point, again, is not that republican legal moralism offers straightforward resolutions to 
controversial aspects of the criminal law. But it does offer essential guidance, as the examples 
above should show, and it does so while preserving the connection between criminal law and 
morality. This modest form oflegal moralism, however, connects the criminal law not with the 
positive or conventional morality of any society, but with the civic morality of fair play within a 
republican polity. If it happens that the conventional morality of a society is in large part consist-
ent with the civic morality of republicanism, then it will be a fortunate society indeed. 
Notes 
I am grateful to Antony Duff and Jonathan Jacobs for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this essay, 
including comments I have not been able to address here. 
2 Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, quoting from the selection reprinted in Stephen 1994: 35. 
3 From Devlin's 1959 lecture, 'The enforcement of morality', reprinted as 'Morals and the criminal law' 
in Devlin 1971: 36-37. 
4 For Moore's legal moralism, see Moore 1997: chs. 1, 16, and 18; and 2008. For Duff's views, see Duff 
2007, esp. ch. 4,and 2014: 217-35. For the grudging respect legal moralism now elicits, see Husak 2008: 
196-206; and Murphy 2012: 69-76. 
5 Indeed, one familiar response to earlier arguments for legal moralism has been to draw a distinction 
between actions that are harmful and those that are immoral, with only actions in the first category to 
be deemed criminal. Such a view is often attributed to Mill in On Liberty. I think it more plausible to 
read Mill as holding that the law ought to concentrate on proscribing actions that are harmful to others 
who have not consented to take part in them, because those actions-and not those "vices" that are 
merely contrary to conventional morality-are the truly immoral actions. In this respect I follow Louch 
(1968), both in his reading of Mill and in his general position with regard to the "libertarian" opponents 
of Devlin's legal moralism. 
6 Note, e.g., Duff's claim (2014: 219) that "Negative Legal Moralism ... seems plausible" because crim-
inal law "inflicts not just penalties, but punishments-impositions that convey a message of censure or 
condemnation; the convictions that precede punishment are not mere neutral findings of fact, that this 
defendant breached this legal rule, but normative judgments that this defendant committed a culpable 
wrong." 
7 One of the current advocates, Antony Duff, has suggested in personal correspondence that Devlin was 
not a legal moralist, properly speaking, but "a proponent of the harm principle, with some curious 
views about how various kinds of conduct could cause social harm." Thus Devlin believed that failure 
to uphold and enforce the conventional morality of a society-including proscriptions of homosexu-
ality, prostitution, and other sexual practices-could lead to the harmful outcome of social dissolution. 
8 Moore does constrain his ambitious legal moralism, however, by allowing that some immoral activities 
and actions should not be deemed criminal because treating them as crimes would prove too limit-
ing or inhibiting of autonomy (e.g., Moore 1997: 75-80). The difference between Moore's ambitious 
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and Duff's modest versions of legal moralism thus proves to be a difference in principle rather than a 
substantial one in what each would count as criminal. 
9 Failure to establish a firm distinction between private and public wrongs also raises the possibility that 
so-called crimes are really private wrongs, and thus to the absorption of criminal into tort law. See, e.g., 
Barnett 1977. 
10 The !oms dassims of discussions of legality is Fuller 1969: ch. 2. 
11 I defend these contentions at length in a forthcoming book, Playing Fair: Political Ob/(1?ation and the 
Problems of Punishment. 
12 For apposite remarks about Aristotle's criticism of "grasping" persons who want "more than their fair 
share of benefits and less than their fair share of burdens," see Yankah 2013: 72. Here and elsewhere in 
his essayYankah uses the language of fair-play theory without explicitly connecting it to republicanism. 
13 Note in this regard John Finnis's statement about the "desiderata" of the rule oflaw: "The fundamental 
point of the desiderata is to secure to the subjects of authority the dignity of self-direction and freedom 
from certain forms of manipulation. The Rule of Law is thus among the requirements of justice or 
fairness" (Finnis 1980: 273). 
14 Indeed, in Pettit's view, "the most crucial idea for a theory of criminalization is that of equal freedom 
as non-domination" (2015: 136). 
15 But cf Morison 2005, n. 160, which holds that fair play can account for both mala prohibita and ma/a 
in se; and Husak 2008: 118-19, for the argument that fair play is limited even as an account of ma/a 
prohibita. 
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